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OF PROVIDENCE AND PUPPET SHOWS:  
DIVINE HIDDENNESS AS KANTIAN THEODICY
Tyler Paytas
Although the free-will reply to divine hiddenness is often associated with 
Kant, the argument typically presented in the literature is not the strongest 
Kantian response. Kant’s central claim is not that knowledge of God would 
preclude the possibility of transgression, but rather that it would preclude 
one’s viewing adherence to the moral law as a genuine sacrifice of self-in-
terest. After explaining why the Kantian reply to hiddenness is superior to 
standard formulations, I argue that, despite Kant’s general skepticism about 
theodicy, his insights pertaining to hiddenness also provide the foundation 
for a new theodicy that merits serious attention.
The problem of divine hiddenness is essentially that of explaining why an 
all-loving and perfectly just deity would not make his existence obvious to 
everyone. Belief in God allows for many practical benefits, including emo-
tional consolation, deterrence from immoral conduct, and a meaningful 
personal relationship with God. Hence, if God exists, it would make sense 
for Him to do everything in His power to make His existence evident to 
everyone (or at least to all those who are open to believing). Yet, the world 
contains millions of people who do not believe in God, and it is doubtful 
that all of them are willfully resistant or epistemically negligent. The fact 
that God remains “hidden” in this way is thus taken by some to constitute 
independent grounds for atheism.1
One of the more influential replies to the hiddenness challenge involves 
an appeal to the moral importance of free will.2 The basic idea is that if 
God’s existence were made evident, the visceral threat of divine punish-
ments (and the allure of eternal rewards) would coerce us into obeying 
1See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason; Lovering, “Inculpable Igno-
rance”; Maitzen “Demographics of Theism.” Whether the problem of divine hiddenness is 
an independent challenge to theism or merely a particular instance of the problem of evil 
remains a matter of dispute. For recent discussion of the relation between the two problems, 
see Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil”; Dumsday, “How 
Divine Hiddenness Sheds Light”; Howard-Snyder and Green, “Hiddenness of God.” 
2See Hick, “Soul-Making Theodicy”; Murray, “Deus Absconditus”; and Swinburne, The 
Existence of God.
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God’s law. Although this would result in right conduct, it would come at 
the cost of morally significant freedom. Critics have rightly challenged 
this response by arguing that there is good reason to believe that clear 
awareness of God would not preclude the possibility of immoral action.3 
Perhaps the best evidence for this is the fact that even devout theists 
readily acknowledge their susceptibility to moral transgression.
The free-will response to hiddenness is often associated with Kant, 
which is unsurprising given that freedom plays an essential role in Kant’s 
ethics. However, the freedom-based argument commonly presented in 
the literature is not the strongest Kantian reply to hiddenness. A careful 
reading of the passage in which Kant most directly addresses the problem, 
with special attention given to the broader context of the work in which it 
is presented, reveals a subtle but important difference in the structure of 
the argument. The central claim is not that one could never act immorally 
in the face of God, but rather that one could never view adherence to the 
moral law as a genuine sacrifice of one’s happiness under such circum-
stances. This is because of the corresponding divine punishments and 
rewards that would presumably be distributed by a just God. In Kant’s 
view, the experience of an apparent conflict between self-interest and 
morality is necessary for gaining awareness of one’s freedom, which is 
in turn essential for developing respect for the moral law as the incentive 
to right conduct. The deep importance of recognizing our freedom and 
subsequently starting down the path towards virtue is what justifies God’s 
preventing knowledge of His existence.4
Not only does this more nuanced freedom-based argument constitute 
a sturdier response to the hiddenness challenge, it may be more fruitful 
than even Kant recognized. Whereas Kant famously argues that our cog-
nitive limitations prevent us from vindicating divine providence in the 
face of suffering and moral evil, his justification for hiddenness can be 
extended to formulate a prima facie credible theodicy. The basic idea is 
that a world entirely devoid of seemingly unnecessary suffering would be 
one in which assent to theistic belief comes too easily, and hence the op-
portunity to experience a conflict between prudence and morality, which 
is indispensable for moral development, would be foreclosed (or at least 
greatly reduced).
My aim in this essay is thus twofold. First, I shall explain why the 
Kantian reply to divine hiddenness is superior to standard formulations 
of the free-will response within recent philosophy of religion literature 
(sections 1–3). Second, I shall argue that not only does Kant’s argument 
constitute a powerful solution to the hiddenness problem, it also—pace 
Kant himself—provides the foundation for a theodicy that merits serious 
attention (sections 4 and 5).
3Schellenberg, “The Hiddenness Argument Revisited.” 
4Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:146–48.
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1. The Standard Free-Will Response
The hiddenness challenge is presented in its strongest form by J. L. Schel-
lenberg.5 The general structure of the argument is as follows: Begin with 
the idea that, on any plausible brand of theism, God would aim to develop 
relationships with human beings (or at least those who are open to such a 
relationship). This is because God is conceived of as all-loving, and seeking 
unity is partly constitutive of being loving. Moreover, such relationships 
enhance the welfare of human beings by providing emotional consolation 
and a deep sense of meaning. However, in order to develop a relationship 
with God, one must first believe that He exists. This implies that God, if 
He exists, would want to ensure that everyone is capable of finding suf-
ficient grounds for such belief. Yet, in the actual world, it appears that 
some people are unable to find such grounds through no fault of their 
own. Schellenberg labels such individuals “non-resistant non-believers,” 
and he takes the fact of their existence to constitute strong evidence for 
atheism.
One of the chief responses to the hiddenness challenge centers on the 
moral significance of free will.6 Richard Swinburne appeals to the intrinsic 
value of the freedom to choose between right and wrong, and the pur-
ported fact that clear awareness of God would undermine this freedom.7 
Given the conception of God as perfectly just and all-powerful, decisive 
evidence for God’s existence would make it painfully obvious that im-
moral conduct is contrary to long-term self-interest. For a perfectly just 
God will presumably punish transgressions and reward those who avoid 
wrongdoing, especially under circumstances in which He has done us the 
service of removing all obstacles to knowledge of His existence. Hence, 
with God continuously in view, any temptation to sin would be swamped 
by the desire to please God and to avoid the dire consequences of violating 
divine law (assuming that God would not also alter basic human desires). 
Swinburne concludes that God chooses to remain hidden because the 
disvalue resulting from the loss of freedom outweighs whatever benefits 
would arise from revelation.8
Schellenberg has proposed several lines of response to the free-will 
argument. What I take to be his strongest reply targets the assumption 
that knowledge of God’s existence would constitute a disincentive to im-
moral conduct so overwhelming that genuine freedom of choice would 
5Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason; The Wisdom of Doubt. 
6Most replies to the hiddenness challenge are presented from the perspective of generic 
theism. For examples of replies from within a Christian perspective, see Dumsday, “Thom-
istic Response”; Moser, The Elusive God.
7Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 203–210; The Existence of God, 267–272. 
8Formulations of the free-will response along similar lines are presented by Hick, ‘Soul-
Making’; McKim, Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity; Murray, “Deus Absconditus.” 
For an interesting variation of the free-will response that focusses on harms to the victims of 
transgressions rather than the agency of the transgressors, see Dumsday, “Divine Hidden-
ness, Free Will, and the Victims of Wrongdoing.” 
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no longer be possible. Schellenberg challenges this claim by emphasizing 
the numerous cases of individuals who, despite their strong belief in God, 
continue to struggle against the temptation to transgress. Perhaps the most 
powerful example of this is that of Paul the apostle. Despite having little 
doubt about God’s existence, Paul still found himself quite capable of sin.9
In responding to this example, Swinburne concedes that believers such 
as Paul can commit ‘venial’ but not ‘mortal’ transgressions, and that the 
general capacity of most people to commit both types of sin is important 
enough to justify God’s hiddenness.10 However, as Schellenberg rightly 
points out, this concession substantially weakens the force of the standard 
free-will response.11 If the general ability to engage in wrongdoing would 
not be eliminated by awareness of God, then it is not obvious that mor-
ally significant freedom would be lost. And common human experience 
makes it clear that, even among believers, the temptation to engage in 
wrongdoing is very real and often succumbed to. Of course, there is a 
difference between faith and knowledge, and it is conceivable that even 
if the former is compatible with sin, the latter is not. Nonetheless, the fact 
that people with an extremely high credence in God’s existence are fully 
capable of wrongdoing is substantial evidence that knowledge of God 
would be compatible with immoral conduct.
Although he judges the preceding reply to be sufficient for blocking 
the free-will response, Schellenberg offers an additional argument that 
he believes would succeed even on the assumption that awareness of 
God would make it impossible to act wrongly. The suggestion is that the 
opportunity for character development, which is what makes free will 
morally significant in the first place, would still exist even if transgression 
were made impossible by God’s becoming evident. Moral development 
would still be possible because developing virtue is not merely a matter of 
choosing to do right rather than wrong; it also requires learning to do the 
right thing for the right reason.
As Schellenberg points out, appeals to the moral significance of freedom 
in the context of the hiddenness debate center on the vital importance of 
agents having the ability to choose the good for its own sake. But there 
are two distinct ways in which one might fail to choose to do good for 
its own sake. First, one might fail because one chooses the bad over the 
good. This is the possibility that Swinburne and Murray believe would be 
eliminated by direct awareness of God. But even if they are right, a second 
way of failing to choose the good for its own sake is to choose the good for 
some other reason, such as that doing so is conducive to self-interest. And 
presumably the opportunity to avoid this type of moral failure would not 
be lost with awareness of God. Since learning to do the right thing for 
the right reason is a key component of moral development, the fact that 
9Romans 7. 
10Swinburne, Providence, 209. 
11Schellenberg, “Revisited,” 293. 
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awareness of God would not determine which reasons motivate a person 
to act rightly seems to imply that the ability to act wrongly is not essential 
for the type of soul-building that critics such as Swinburne and Murray 
appeal to.12
While this second reply is interesting, I do not find it persuasive. As I 
shall explain in the next two sections, there is good reason to doubt that 
proper moral development would be possible under circumstances in 
which acting rightly is always perceived to be in one’s self-interest (as it 
would be with knowledge of God). But Schellenberg’s initial reply to the 
standard free-will response stands nonetheless. Knowledge of God would 
likely not preclude the possibility of transgression, and so a free-will re-
sponse based on the purported impossibility of wrongdoing in the face 
of God is unpersuasive. A successful freedom-based reply will have to 
explain how moral development would be jeopardized by knowledge of 
God even if the capacity to act wrongly were preserved. I believe such an 
explanation is provided by Kant, whose argument I turn to now.
2. Kant on the Wisdom of Our Cognitive Limitations
As mentioned, the free-will response to divine hiddenness is often associ-
ated with Kant. Not only is freedom foundational within Kantian ethics, 
there is an important passage in the second Critique in which Kant seems 
to present an argument along the lines of the standard free-will response. 
In a section titled “On the Wise Adaptation of the Human Being’s Cog-
nitive Faculties to His Practical Vocation,” Kant describes the practical 
effects that theoretical knowledge of God’s existence would bring:
Unless our whole nature were at the same time changed, the inclinations, 
which always have the first word, would first demand their satisfaction 
and, combined with reasonable reflection, their greatest possible and most 
lasting satisfaction under the name of happiness; the moral law would af-
terwards speak. . . . But instead of the conflict that the moral disposition 
now has to carry on with the inclinations, in which, though after some de-
feats, moral strength of soul is to be gradually acquired, God and eternity with 
their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes (for what we can 
prove perfectly holds as much certainty for us as what we are assured of by 
our sight). Transgression of the law would, no doubt, be avoided: what is 
commanded would be done; but because the disposition from which actions 
ought to be done cannot be instilled by any command, and because the spur 
to activity in this case would be promptly at hand and external, reason would 
have no need to work itself up so as to gather strength to resist the inclina-
tions by a lively representation of the dignity of law; hence most actions 
conforming to the law would be done from fear, only a few from hope, and 
none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the 
eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world 
depends, would not exist at all. As long as human nature remains as it is, 
human conduct would thus be changed into a mere mechanism in which, as 
12Schellenberg, “Revisited,” 294–295; see also Watkins, “Kant on the Hiddenness of God,” 
86, 91–92.
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in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but there would be no 
life in the figures.13
Eric Watkins is among those Kant scholars who have noted the signif-
icance of these remarks for the contemporary hiddenness debate.14 
However, Watkins claims that Kant’s argument is ultimately unsuccessful. 
He considers two interpretations of the argument, and he sees devastating 
flaws in both. On one interpretation, Kant’s central claim is that knowl-
edge of God would preclude the performance of morally worthy actions 
because it is impossible to act from the motive of duty in circumstances 
where one’s inclinations already line up with the morally right action. 
Watkins challenges this claim on the grounds that it relies on unwarranted 
assumptions about human motivational psychology. He finds it at least as 
plausible that we can act from the verdicts of reason rather than inclination 
regardless of whether the right action happens to align with our desires. 
The motivational primacy of reason may just be a natural consequence of 
maturing into adulthood.15
On a second interpretation, Kant’s central claim is essentially the same 
as that of what I’ve been calling the standard free-will response. On this 
reading, Kant’s point is that knowledge of God would bring with it a 
representation of threats and promises that would be too overwhelming 
for a human being to resist. As a result of God’s “awful majesty” and the 
ominous threat of eternal punishments standing continuously before us, 
willful moral violation would not be a genuine possibility. And in the ab-
sence of genuine freedom to choose between right and wrong, humanity 
would be changed into a mere mechanism.
Watkins challenges this second version of the argument on several 
fronts, including worries about the extent to which knowledge of God 
would bring representation of eternal threats and promises, as well as a 
purported inconsistency between the argument and Kant’s overall posi-
tion in the second Critique.16 But the strongest reason for skepticism about 
this version of the argument is one we have seen already. As Schellenberg 
emphasizes in response to Swinburne and Murray, there are ample cases 
of people who are fully capable of acting wrongly (and in fact often do so) 
despite a robust belief in God and the corresponding punishments and 
rewards. And the existence of such individuals casts substantial doubt 
on the assumption that God’s becoming evident to us would destroy our 
freedom by rendering immoral conduct impossible.17
13Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:147. This discussion is echoed in Critique of Judgement, 
5:481; Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, 28:1084; Reflexionen, 18:55. 
14Watkins, “Kant.” See also Neiman, The Unity of Reason; Drabkin, “The Moralist’s Fear”; 
and Timmermann, “Why Some Things Must Remain Unknown.” 
15Watkins, “Kant,” 86. 
16Watkins, “Kant,” 90–93. 
17Cf. Watkins, “Kant,” 93–113. Although Watkins believes Kant’s practical (i.e., free-
dom-based) argument fails to solve the hiddenness problem, he constructs a theoretical 
Kantian solution that he finds plausible. The basic idea is that it is beyond God’s power to 
62 Faith and Philosophy
Although I agree that the Kantian argument fails on both of the above in-
terpretations, neither reading constitutes the strongest formulation. When 
viewed in isolation, it is indeed tempting to interpret Kant’s remarks as 
conveying the same general point found in the standard free-will response 
to hiddenness. But I do not believe this is the strongest reading. Recall 
the first of Watkins’s interpretations mentioned above. On this reading, 
the central claim of the argument concerns knowledge of God precluding 
the possibility of moral worth. This interpretation comes closer to cap-
turing Kant’s position. However, Kant’s argument does not require the 
assumption that inclination must always have motivational primacy in the 
manner that Watkins suggests. Kant’s explanation for God’s hiddenness is 
logically consistent with the possibility of agents acting from the motive 
of duty on particular occasions in which prudence and morality happen 
to align. As I shall now explain, what would not be possible is acting from 
the motive of duty if prudence and morality were always perceived to be 
aligned. In Kant’s view, what is required for the motivational primacy of 
duty is that the individual has had at least some experience of an apparent 
conflict between self-interest and the law. And it is this sort of experience 
that Kant believes would be rendered impossible by knowledge of God.
3. Kant’s Moral Justification for Divine Hiddenness
In order to see why Kant’s argument is based on the importance of expe-
riencing an apparent conflict between morality and prudence, we must 
consider the broader context of the second Critique. Of particular impor-
tance is the deduction of freedom offered in the Analytic of Pure Practical 
Reason. Whereas in the Groundwork Kant attempts to vindicate morality 
by appealing to freedom, the strategy in the Analytic is to vindicate 
freedom by appeal to the apodictic certainty of morality. Kant argues that 
we become immediately conscious of the moral law as soon as we engage 
in the process of setting ends and acting on maxims. When we consider 
acting on a maxim that we could not endorse as a universal law for all 
rational beings, we experience a type of constraint that is altogether dif-
ferent from the constraints provided by external authority figures such as 
political rulers or police officers. The constraint of morality is distinctive 
in that it is completely independent from inclination and considerations of 
self-interest. We thus become conscious of the moral law in the same way 
that we become aware of pure theoretical principles, “by attending to the 
necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and to the setting aside 
of all empirical conditions to which reason directs us.”18
make his existence evident to us because of the limits of human cognitive capacities. While I 
do not take issue with Watkins’s recounting of Kant’s views on our theoretical limitations as 
they pertain to the question of God, I don’t find these considerations sufficient for resolving 
the hiddenness problem without further explanation for why God would have chosen to (or 
had to) limit our capacities in this way. For relevant discussion, see King, Obstacles to Divine 
Revelation. 
18Kant, Practical Reason, 5:30.
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Given that theoretical philosophy and the natural sciences have no need 
to postulate practical freedom, Kant suggests that we would never have 
taken the notion seriously were it not for the moral law.19 But as it happens, 
our experience of the unique constraint of duty gives us our first insight 
into the supersensible realm and the fact that we are genuinely free. Kant 
dramatically illustrates this point with the example of the Gallows Man.20 
He first asks us to consider a person who claims to be incapable of con-
trolling his sensuous desires. Suppose we were to ask this man whether he 
could overcome his lust if gallows were constructed in front of the house 
where his temptation leads him, and he were to be hanged as an immediate 
consequence of acting on it. Upon considering this question, the Gallows 
Man would immediately recognize that his desire to live is even stronger 
than his lust. But suppose that we next ask him whether the threat of those 
same gallows would equally compel him to slander and ruin an innocent 
man whom a corrupt prince seeks to unjustly convict. Kant claims that 
while the Gallows Man could not know for certain how he would respond 
to the prince’s command, he would have to admit that it is possible for him 
to willingly face execution rather than to engage in deception and thereby 
facilitate a grave injustice. The Gallows Man’s recognition of his ability to 
overcome his desire to live, a desire more powerful than even his lust, is 
of monumental importance. For it is in this moment that he can first begin 
to view himself as free not merely in the negative sense of being able to 
pursue desire satisfaction without interference, but in the positive sense 
of being able to act by the laws of pure practical reason. In Kant’s words, 
“He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is aware that 
he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, which, without the 
moral law, would have remained unknown to him.”21
The Gallows Man example is a vivid illustration of how the experience 
of moral obligation provides initial insight into one’s freedom. But the ex-
ample is also instructive for helping us see how moral worth and virtue 
become possible. Kant famously holds that morally worthy action is done 
from the motive of duty. And human virtue is manifested through striving 
to cultivate a will in which respect for the moral law takes precedence 
19Kant, Practical Reason, 5:30.
20My appreciation of the importance of this example is due in large part to Grenberg, 
Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience. 
21Kant, Practical Reason, 5:30. The deduction of freedom remains a contentious issue 
among Kant scholars, and my interpretation of the Fact of Reason argument is not uncon-
troversial. My reading draws independent support from the following considerations. First, 
it allows for a stronger reconstruction of Kant’s argument concerning God’s hiddenness. 
Second, it helps resolve a tension between Kant’s remarks about the importance of ignorance 
of God and his claim that an afterlife is necessary for continued moral development. Each 
of these points will become clear in what follows. For relevant discussion of the deduction 
of freedom, see inter alia, Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques; Allison, Transcendental Ide-
alism; Guyer, “Naturalistic and Transcendental”; Wood, Kantian Ethics; Kleingeld, “Moral 
Consciousness”; Grenberg, Kant’s Defense. 
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over inclinations whenever the two conflict.22 A key step on the path to-
wards virtue is thus the development of respect for morality. And this 
respect cannot develop until we experience the moral law as an incentive 
to action that is distinct from and superior to our desire for happiness. 
Fortunately, most of us experience the conflict between duty and self-in-
terest in circumstances less extreme than the threat of execution. But even 
more mundane moral-prudential conflicts play the same key epistemic 
role. Kant puts the point thus:
The dissimilarity of determining grounds (empirical and rational) is made 
known by this resistance of a practically lawgiving reason to every meddling 
inclination, by a special kind of feeling, which, however, does not precede the 
lawgiving of practical reason but is instead produced only by it and indeed 
as a constraint, namely through the feeling of a respect such as no human 
being has for inclinations of whatever kind but does have for the law.23
Once we experience a conflict between prudence and morality and the re-
sulting incentive to action that is independent from self-interest, we begin 
to understand that what differentiates us from other creatures is not just 
our intelligence. For we are capable of transcending our animal nature, 
including even our desire to live, in order to follow the dictates of pure 
practical reason. In reflecting on this fact, the objective law presents itself 
to us as having a certain dignity, and appreciating this dignity is what 
allows us to begin acting from the motive of duty and hence developing a 
genuinely good will.
These lessons from the Analytic provide a crucial lens through which 
we can more clearly see Kant’s central claim pertaining to the hiddenness 
of God in the Dialectic. The key claim is that developing virtue requires 
the experience of an apparent conflict between self-interest and the moral 
law. Such an experience would not be possible if God were evident from 
the beginning. Under such circumstances, the moral law would never ap-
pear to us as requiring a genuine sacrifice of self-interest (due to the likely 
divine punishments and rewards). Of course, we would still perceive obe-
dience to the law as requiring a sacrifice of our immediate self-interest; 
acting rightly often requires suppressing one’s inclinations. However, 
this perceived sacrifice would not be enough to start us down that path 
towards virtue because it wouldn’t provide insight into our positive 
freedom. For all we could tell, we would merely be more sophisticated 
and prudent versions of animals that are governed solely by the aim of 
satisfying inclinations. The sacrifice of proximate happiness for the sake 
of long-term happiness is not the sort of transformative experience needed 
for moral progress to begin. What is needed is a state of affairs in which 
22Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:407–409; 6:535. Kant emphasizes that virtue is never com-
plete but rather always in a state progress (Kant, Practical Reason, 5:122; Metaphysics of Morals, 
6:409). For an exemplary treatment of Kant’s theory of virtue, see Baxley, Kant’s Theory of 
Virtue. 
23Kant, Practical Reason, 5:92.
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we lack grounds for believing that obedience to the law is conducive to 
self-interest at all. This is the Gallows Man experience, and it requires ig-
norance of God.
In the absence of a Gallows Man experience we would lack epistemic 
access to our freedom to act from the law-giving of our own reason, 
and we would fail to properly appreciate the supremacy of the law over 
self-interest. This explains Kant’s claim that if duty and self-interest al-
ways appeared in alignment (as they would with knowledge of God), 
“the former [would] effect nothing at all, and though physical life might 
gain some force, the moral life would fade away irrecoverably.”24 These 
remarks from the Analytic are echoed in the Dialectic where Kant claims 
that knowledge of God would transform human conduct into an elaborate 
puppet show in which “everything would gesticulate well but there would 
be no life in the figures.”25
In light of the foregoing considerations, I propose the following recon-
struction of Kant’s freedom-based justification for divine hiddenness:26
1. The development of virtue requires an experience of conflict be-
tween self-interest and the moral law.
2. God’s revealing himself would preclude all experience of conflict 
between self-interest and the moral law.
3. God’s revealing himself would preclude the possibility of virtue. 
(from 1–2)
4. Without the possibility of virtue, human existence would be mean-
ingless.
5. God’s revealing himself would render human existence meaning-
less. (from 3–4)
6. A perfectly rational deity would not choose to render human exis-
tence meaningless.
7. God’s keeping himself hidden is consistent with his perfect ratio-
nality.27 (from 5–6)
We have already seen the central motivations for the first two premises. 
One additional point concerning these premises bears mentioning. By 
24Kant, Practical Reason, 5:89.
25Kant, Practical Reason, 5:147.
26I present this formulation in an article addressed primarily to Kant specialists rather 
than philosophers of religion (Paytas, “God’s Awful Majesty”). Much of that article is ded-
icated to showing that the argument is consistent with central Kantian doctrine, which is 
an issue beyond the scope of the present essay. For an interpretation that is generally in 
agreement with my reconstruction, see Timmermann, “Why Some Things Must Remain 
Unknown.” 
27Kant does seem to allow for the possibility of miracles. However, he claims that we 
cannot establish them as such (Religion, 6:84–88). Hence, in Kant’s view God is still hidden 
in the relevant sense. 
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reconstructing Kant’s argument so that the key issue is the experience of 
conflict between prudence and morality, we can resolve an apparent ten-
sion in Kant’s thought. It is initially puzzling how Kant’s claims about the 
moral importance of ignorance of God can be squared with his claim that 
progress towards virtue must be continued in the afterlife.28 Although we 
do not know what the afterlife is like, it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that continued existence in the great beyond would involve knowledge of 
God. Hence, if moral development requires ignorance of God, it is not clear 
how progress towards virtue can continue beyond the grave. However, ac-
cording to the proposed reconstruction, ignorance of God is essential only 
for an initial experience of moral-prudential conflict that provides insight 
into freedom and allows one to start down the path towards virtue. Once 
the process is started, it may be possible for individuals to continue their 
moral development even after gaining awareness of God. Hence, it is not 
inconsistent for Kant to claim that God has strong reasons to remain hidden 
while also claiming that full moral development requires life after death.
The two remaining substantive premises are 4 and 6. Premise 4 is 
an evaluative claim that is admittedly controversial. There are several 
plausible candidate sources of meaningfulness in human life including 
achievement, enjoyment, and intimate relationships. One might reason-
ably hold that a life containing some combination of these can qualify as 
meaningful even in the absence of virtue.
In considering this worry, note first that those who press the hiddenness 
challenge often concede the essential importance of moral development 
by qualifying their position such that God is expected to reveal himself 
to non-resistant non-believers. The thought here is that God would not 
seek relationships at the cost of undermining freedom and moral agency. 
Moreover, we must keep in mind that in order for Kant’s argument to 
constitute a compelling solution to the problem of divine hiddenness it is 
not necessary that the central claims about value and meaning be incon-
trovertible. It is only necessary that these ideas are plausible enough to 
yield a reasonable explanation for God’s remaining hidden that is in prin-
ciple compatible with his possessing the divine attributes. The evaluative 
claim that comprises premise 4 meets this minimal standard. While the 
alternative views mentioned above are not altogether unreasonable, the 
suggestion that virtue is essential for a worthwhile life is hardly foreign 
to common consciousness.29 Even if we judge that enjoyment and achieve-
ment are ineliminable parts of the human good, we can still agree with 
Kant that a meaningful human life must include moral development. The 
plausibility of this thought is perhaps most readily seen when we consider 
the hopes we have for our children. Although parents are typically proud 
28Kant, Practical Reason, 5:122.
29Of course, philosophical support for the supreme importance of virtue is provided 
throughout the Kantian corpus. See especially Kant, Groundwork, 4:393–401; Practical Reason, 
5:86–89. 
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of their children’s achievements and glad when they find happiness, I 
suspect that few parents would maintain these positive attitudes upon 
realizing that their child is completely devoid of moral virtue.30
Premise 6 states that a perfectly rational deity would not choose to 
render human existence meaningless. This should be relatively uncontro-
versial. The motivating thought is that God’s choice to populate the world 
with human beings could only be rational if human life were meaningful. 
And human life has the potential for meaning precisely because of our 
moral capacities. As Kant writes in Religion, “That which alone can make 
a world the object of divine decree and the end of creation is Humanity . . . 
in its full moral perfection.”31
One might challenge Premise 6 by arguing that the costs of God’s 
hiddenness outweigh the positives of meaningful human existence. This 
might be argued on the grounds that widespread awareness of God 
would be sufficient for eliminating much of the suffering on earth because 
it would deter harmful acts and console those who are in distress. It is 
indeed highly plausible that the world would be a happier place if God 
were not hidden. But whether the world would be a better place on the 
whole is a different matter. If Kant is right, then happiness is valuable 
only on the condition that it is deserved.32 And based on Kant’s account 
of moral development, knowledge of God would make it impossible for 
us to develop virtue and make ourselves deserving of happiness. While 
these are controversial views, they are far from outlandish. And as before, 
the success of Kant’s argument does not depend on the truth of the prem-
ises being beyond reasonable doubt. As long as the relevant claims about 
virtue, value, and divine willing are reasonably plausible, the force of the 
hiddenness challenge is mitigated.
As with any argument that purports to resolve a deep and long-standing 
debate, there are multiple additional points of contention concerning 
my reconstruction. I discuss additional objections, including intramural 
Kantian worries, in other works.33 My present aim is only to demonstrate 
that Kant’s argument is much more formidable than the standard free-
30Here one might concede that virtue is special but still insist that human life devoid 
of virtue could have some meaning. This point of view can be accommodated by revising 
the argument so that the relevant claim is just that the preclusion of virtue would cause a 
decrease in meaningfulness substantial enough to outweigh the purported benefits of revela-
tion. Such a formulation would still capture the central thrust of the argument and constitute 
a powerful reply to hiddenness. I have opted for the “meaningless” formulation because I 
believe this more accurately represents Kant’s view. 
31Kant, Religion, 6:60.
32Kant, Groundwork, 4:393; Practical Reason, 5:63–64. 
33Paytas, “God’s Awful Majesty.” One challenge that bears mentioning here is the question 
of why God does not reveal himself to all those who have already had the crucial experience 
of conflict between prudence and morality. In brief, the answer is that full development of 
virtue requires continual struggle that persists beyond the initial awareness of one’s freedom. 
For some individuals at certain stages in their development, knowledge of God (as opposed 
to morally grounded faith) may remove motivational obstacles that are crucial for their con-
tinued moral growth. 
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will response. The clearest respect in which Kant’s argument is stronger 
is that it is not vulnerable to Schellenberg’s most forceful reply, which is 
that knowledge of God is unlikely to eliminate one’s capacity for wrong-
doing. As we have seen, Kant’s argument does not rely on the claim that 
awareness of God would make it impossible to act wrongly. Rather, the 
key insight is that such knowledge would make it impossible to view obe-
dience to the law as a genuine sacrifice of one’s happiness. In other words, 
rather than emphasizing the value of our negative freedom to act however 
we may be inclined to, Kant appeals to the significance of the positive 
freedom that we exercise when we make self-interest subordinate to the 
universal laws of pure practical reason.
We have also seen how Kant’s argument avoids another challenge 
presented by both Schellenberg and Watkins. This reply says that even 
if knowledge of God rendered moral transgression impossible, it would 
not thereby preclude moral development because agents could still learn 
to do the right thing for reasons beyond self-interest. While it is certainly 
true that we might act rightly out of amiable motives such as sympathetic 
concern for others, Kant presents a plausible case for this being insuffi-
cient for genuine moral worth. In order to exhibit moral worth, one must 
act out of respect for the moral law, and there are strong reasons to doubt 
whether such respect could arise under circumstances in which doing the 
right thing is always recommended by considerations of prudence.
Even if we accept the central Kantian doctrine that supplies the foun-
dation for Kant’s solution to hiddenness, we might still wonder why God 
does not do more to prevent suffering while remaining hidden. Although 
I have elsewhere stressed the point that Kant’s argument is not intended to 
solve the problem of evil, I believe the considerations he raises can be used 
to formulate a theodicy worthy of serious consideration. Of course, Kant 
famously argues that attempts to vindicate divine providence are not only 
bound to fail, they also manifest dispositions to servility and insincerity.34 
Hence, before considering the hiddenness-based theodicy it will be neces-
sary to examine Kant’s anti-theodicy position.
4. Kant on the “Miscarriage” of Theodicy
In his essay “On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theo-
dicy,” Kant describes theodicy as the attempt to vindicate God’s infinite 
goodness and wisdom in light of the challenge presented by the many 
things in the world that strike us as “counterpurposive.”35 He divides the 
counterpurposive objects into three categories: (1) moral evil (i.e., sin and 
wrongdoing), (2) natural evil (i.e., pain and suffering), and (3) injustice 
(i.e., disproportion between moral transgression and just punishment). 
34Kant, “Miscarriage,” 8:267–267. 
35Kant, “Miscarriage,” 8:255. Perhaps the most famous historical attempt to reply to the 
problem of evil is Leibniz’s Theodicy. For recent discussion of this work, see Jorgensen and 
Newlands, New Essays on Leibniz’s Theodicy. For an overview of Leibniz’s impact on Kant, see 
Wilson, “Leibniz’s Influence.”
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The appearance of moral evil, natural evil, and injustice constitute a 
challenge to the existence of God because an all-loving, omnipotent, and 
perfectly just deity would presumably not allow such things to exist.
Kant considers various attempts to defend God against the appearance 
of the three kinds of evil, and he argues that all of them fail.36 Regarding 
moral evil, an initially credible reply holds that, given the necessary lim-
itations of finite human beings, God could not prevent moral wrongdoing 
without undermining freedom, and preserving human freedom is more 
important than precluding moral transgression. Kant rejects this theodicy 
because it ostensibly implies that the true source of moral evil is not in the 
will of human beings but rather in the “necessary limitations of humanity 
as a finite nature.”37 If the combination of our sensible inclinations and 
the capacity to act on them makes wrongdoing inevitable, then we are not 
ultimately responsible for our transgressions. But it is undeniable that we 
are bound by the moral law, and this implies that we are morally respon-
sible for our conduct. Hence, this attempt to vindicate God against the 
problem of moral evil fails.38
Kant’s argument is unconvincing. It is true that we could not develop 
virtue without possessing inclinations and the freedom to pursue their 
satisfaction. And it is also true that we do not choose to be born with the 
sensible inclinations that lead us astray. But neither of these points im-
plies that we cannot be held responsible for our choosing to act on our 
inclinations when they conflict with duty. We may not have chosen to face 
the obstacles that must be overcome on the path towards virtue, but that 
is not sufficient for removing responsibility for our transgressions. If the 
highest good (a world where universal virtue leads to universal happiness) 
is a worthy divine purpose, as Kant believes it is, then the fact that this 
end could not be attained without our having the capacity for transgres-
sion should constitute a satisfactory explanation for moral evil.39 The fact 
that we are not responsible for our capacity to sin, a capacity which is 
necessary for the ultimate divine purpose, does not imply that we are not 
responsible for our sins.
As for the presence of excessive pain and suffering among human beings 
(referred to as “ills”), one common theodicy holds that human suffering 
on earth is a necessary precursor for the abundance of happiness we will 
enjoy in the afterlife after having earned it during the years of struggle in 
36Due to space considerations I shall limit my focus to those theodicies having the most 
prima facie plausibility. For a reading of Kant’s arguments in the theodicy essay that is sim-
ilar to the reading presented here, see Brachtendorf, “Kant’s Theodizee-Aufsatz.” 
37Kant, “Miscarriage,” 8:259.
38This reply to moral evil has similarities to a theodicy that Kant himself had advocated in 
the decade prior to the publication of the “Miscarriage” essay in 1791. For discussion of how 
Kant’s change in views on theodicy was intertwined with the development of his doctrine of 
radical evil and the positive assessment of the inclinations in Religion, see Duncan, “Moral 
Evil, Freedom and the Goodness of God,” and Gressis, “Kant’s Theodicy.” For in-depth treat-
ment of Religion, see Pasternack, Kant’s Religion, and Palmquist, Comprehensive Commentary. 
39Kant, Religion, 6:60. 
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the present life. Although it may indeed be the case that our blessed state 
in the hereafter would be impossible without our enduring hardships on 
earth, Kant rejects this defense because it rests on presuppositions about 
the supersensible realm that we are not entitled to make.40
Kant raises the same objection against theodicies that attempt to explain 
away injustice by appealing to an ultimate rectification in the afterlife. 
Here again Kant objects that we cannot justify the state of the world by 
appealing to things that we have no insight into: “For as regards the possi-
bility that the end of this terrestrial life might not perhaps be the end of all 
life, such a possibility cannot count as a vindication of providence; rather, 
it is merely a decree of morally believing reason which directs the doubter 
to patience but does not satisfy him.”41
Kant’s rejection of these strategies rests on a defective conception of 
what theodicies aim to accomplish.42 If theodicies had to conclusively 
demonstrate providence, Kant would be justified in rejecting appeals to 
the afterlife. But this is not what theodicies need to do. Note first that 
the problem of evil should not be understood as an attempt to conclu-
sively demonstrate that God does not exist. Instead, it should be seen as 
a challenge to the reasonableness of theism. The religious skeptic draws 
attention to the appearance of evil in the world, and evil is prima facie 
incompatible with the will of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenev-
olent deity. Hence, in order to prevent the reasonableness of belief in God 
from being substantially diminished, the theist needs to provide a plau-
sible explanation for why a morally perfect God would allow the presence 
of that which constitutes the appearance of evil, either by denying that it 
really is inherently evil or by showing how it is justified as a necessary 
means to a greater good. Providing such an explanation does not require a 
conclusive demonstration of God’s existence or claims to knowledge about 
the operations of the supersensible realm. All that is required is positing a 
possible motive for allowing the evil in question that would be consistent 
with the will of an all-wise and morally perfect creator.
The fact that Kant was too quick in rejecting theodicies directed at moral 
evil and injustice does not imply that his general skepticism towards the 
40Kant, “Miscarriage,” 8:260.
41Kant, “Miscarriage,” 8:261. 
42The term ‘theodicy’ is sometimes used to refer to the ambitious goal of demonstrating 
that all apparent evil is for the best and that God does in fact exist. In this context, ‘theodicy’ 
is sometimes contrasted with ‘defense,’ which is the label given to the more modest task of 
showing how belief in God can still be reasonable even if we lack a definitive explanation of 
why God allows evil (Tooley, “The Problem of Evil”). I do not wish to take a strong stance re-
garding terminology. My central claim in this section is only that, contrary to what Kant says, 
theists have good reason to search for a plausible explanation for why God would allow evil 
(and it may be possible to find one). I shall refer to such explanations as ‘theodicies’ partly 
because a ‘defense’ might appeal to independent grounds for believing in God (e.g., the 
ontological argument) without directly addressing the issue of evil. I believe it is worthwhile 
to attempt to preserve the reasonableness of belief in God against the problem of evil in a 
more direct way, and it seems appropriate to distinguish all such attempts as theodicies, even 
though some of them are less ambitious than others. 
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enterprise of theodicy was unwarranted. The problems of moral evil 
and injustice are hardly the most formidable instantiations of the gen-
eral problem of evil. The toughest challenge for the theist is to provide 
a plausible explanation for how the existence of a morally perfect God is 
compatible with the excessive amounts of suffering on earth, particularly 
the suffering that is not caused by human agency but is rather a result 
of natural processes. Recall that the strongest explanation Kant considers 
posits that the suffering of each individual is necessary for their becoming 
worthy of the abundance of happiness that they will receive in the here-
after. Although Kant was wrong to reject this defense merely on the 
grounds that it appeals to the supersensible, it fails nonetheless. For even 
if each individual needs to experience some suffering in order to make 
genuine moral progress, this could not justify all of the natural evil that 
we observe.
This becomes quite obvious when we consider examples of individuals 
who suffer without subsequently experiencing the opportunity to grow 
from it. This includes children who undergo painful illnesses or injuries 
leading to a premature death (i.e., before they become fully agential). It 
also includes the countless non-human animals who, even in their nat-
ural environments (i.e., without human interference), are subjected to 
immense undeserved suffering through predation, injury, and starva-
tion.43 Explaining how the vast amounts of naturally occurring suffering 
in children and animals can be consistent with the existence of God is a 
daunting task, and a successful defense on this score must go beyond a 
bare appeal to the importance of the individual’s suffering as a means to 
her own moral development and worthiness of a blessed afterlife.
Hence, the general pessimism towards traditional theodicies in Kant’s 
essay was not entirely unjustified. However, Kant’s case against the merits 
of traditional theodicies is overstated. As we have seen, a defense of the 
reasonableness of faith in response to the problem of evil does not require 
bold and insincere claims to knowledge about the supersensible realm. All 
that is necessary is a reasonable explanation for how a perfectly just God 
could allow evil in the world. Further, although the absence of a plausible 
response to the problem of evil does not render theism completely unten-
able, it does substantially weaken its grounds. And while dogmatically 
assuming that all suffering is somehow deserved may be a servile attempt 
to win God’s favor,44 the aim of preserving the reasonableness of one’s 
beliefs is a legitimate endeavor for any rational being. Hence, pace Kant, 
the project of traditional theodicy is not without merit.
5. Divine Hiddenness as Kantian Theodicy
As noted at the outset, the problems of evil and divine hiddenness are 
closely related. Both are challenges to the reasonableness of theism based 
43Rowe, “The Problem of Evil,” 1979. 
44Kant, “Miscarriage,” 8:267–267.
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on facts about the empirical world (e.g., excessive suffering, injustice, 
non-resistant non-belief) that are prima facie incompatible with God’s ex-
istence. Some traditional replies to both problems appeal to the ostensible 
fact that knowledge of God would prevent the capacity for wrongdoing, 
which is essential for genuine morality. Such replies are unconvincing in 
both instances. In the case of hiddenness, free-will replies rely on dubious 
claims about the impossibility of moral transgression after gaining knowl-
edge of God. In the case of evil, free-will replies fail to explain the presence 
of the suffering that has no obvious connection to autonomous choice or 
moral development (e.g., the suffering of animals in nature). While the 
value of freedom can plausibly resolve the problem of moral evil, the for-
midable problem of natural evil remains.
Kant’s reply to hiddenness is stronger than standard free-will replies 
because it focusses on the importance of conflict between prudence and 
morality rather than the alleged impossibility of wrongdoing after gaining 
knowledge of God. Since the problems of hiddenness and evil have much 
in common, it is worth exploring whether the Kantian reply to hiddenness 
might also provide groundwork for a stronger theodicy directed at nat-
ural evil. If ignorance of God is necessary for moral development, perhaps 
the seemingly undeserved suffering in the world can be explained away 
by its role in keeping God hidden. In the rest of this section I shall outline 
this novel Kantian theodicy and explain why it is a promising strategy for 
proponents of theism to pursue further.45
Kant concludes his passage on the practical implications of our lack 
of divine knowledge by noting that God’s hiddenness makes Him all the 
more praiseworthy: “Thus what the study of nature and of the human 
being teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here also: that 
the inscrutable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of veneration 
in what it has denied us than it what it has granted us.”46 Now, suppose 
that in addition to doing us the benefit of preventing knowledge of His 
existence, God also created the world such that it did not contain any nat-
ural evil. In other words, imagine that aside from the pain and suffering 
that human beings inflict on themselves and other sentient beings (which 
is accounted for by free will), the world was otherwise devoid of all ills. 
Would this not make God even more worthy of veneration? And wouldn’t 
such a world be what we would expect as the product of supreme wisdom 
and limitless power?
One reason for a negative answer to these questions is that the elim-
ination of natural evil could undermine God’s wise choice to keep His 
existence hidden. This would most certainly be the case in a world where 
injuries were immediately healed and other maladies were instantaneously 
45While the evidential problem of evil has both moral and natural components, I shall 
restrict my focus to natural evils because the problem of moral evil is plausibly addressed 
by standard appeals to the importance of free will. For relevant discussion, see Plantinga, 
“Degenerate Evidence,” and van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil. 
46Kant, Practical Reason, 5:148. 
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rectified. Under such circumstances, it would be difficult to resist the 
conclusion that there is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent intelligence 
operating in the background and overseeing the events of the world.47 
Hence, if Kant is right that God’s hiddenness is part of His inscrutable 
wisdom, then God would have strong reasons not to create a world devoid 
of natural evil.
However, there is an important difference between natural ills being 
immediately healed or remedied and such ills not occurring in the first 
place. The instantaneous rectification of natural suffering would presum-
ably defy all attempts at scientific explanation, and hence it would be 
quite reasonable to conclude that there is a supernatural force (i.e., God) 
operating behind the scenes. But such post hoc interference would not be 
the only way for God to eliminate natural evils. Presumably, God could 
have designed the world such that illness, injury, droughts, and violent 
weather were not natural occurrences. And if the world were designed 
so that these calamities never occur in the first place, we wouldn’t need 
to extend beyond science to explain and understand the empirical realm. 
Thus, it may be that the elimination of natural evil is compatible with 
God’s remaining hidden after all.
To see whether this is plausible, we must try to imagine what it would 
be like to live in a world completely devoid of naturally occurring illnesses 
and bodily ailments, as well as natural disasters such as earthquakes and 
hurricanes. A further feature of such a world would be that non-human 
animals would never experience pain or suffering (unless caused by the 
free choices of human beings). This world without natural evil would ob-
viously be very different from the actual world, and so it is difficult to 
draw reliable conclusions about what we might be disposed to believe. 
But there is reason to think that it would be difficult for some individuals 
to sustain doubts about God’s existence under such circumstances. For 
many people, the primary source of doubt concerning God’s existence is 
the prevalence of seemingly unnecessary suffering. Were this obstacle to 
faith completely removed, at least some of these individuals may develop 
an unwavering belief in God from an early age.
This suggestion is admittedly speculative. But note that a hidden-
ness-based theodicy does not require the strong assumption that it would 
be impossible or irrational to doubt God’s existence in an ill-free world. 
What is needed is only the weaker claim that under such circumstances it 
would be too easy for some people to fully assent to belief in God prior to 
the start of their moral development and without ever harboring serious 
doubts. Perhaps some who are skeptical by nature would still arrive at 
atheism or agnosticism in a world devoid of natural ills. But of those mul-
titudes in the actual world who believe in God even in the face of vast 
undeserved suffering, it is quite possible that many would acquire a belief 
approximating certitude if raised in a world without any such suffering.
47Dumsday, “How Divine Hiddenness Sheds Light,” 319. 
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Here one might object that naturally occurring suffering is actually a 
great spur to faith, and that contentment breeds unbelief. This suggests 
that a world devoid of natural ills might actually have less rather than 
more theistic belief. However, while one’s own suffering can motivate be-
lief in God as a source of consolation, witnessing the suffering of others 
is often the greatest obstacle to belief. Hence, while one’s own lack of 
suffering might decrease one’s chances of believing in God, perceiving a 
world altogether devoid of natural suffering might make belief in divine 
providence difficult to resist, even without any need for personal con-
solation. Of course, these are not the sort of claims that can be verified 
empirically. But the speculative nature of these considerations does not 
undermine their significance. As I shall explain presently, the success of 
the theodicy outlined in this section actually requires that the proposed 
justification for natural evil not be beyond doubt.
If it is indeed the case that a complete lack of natural evil would prevent 
many individuals from experiencing religious doubts, such a world would 
be one in which many people are deprived of the conflict experience that 
Kant takes to be essential for moral development. Recall the gallows ex-
ample. If the Gallows Man did not have doubts about God’s existence, 
then recognition of his ability to disobey the corrupt prince at the cost of 
his life would not provide a glimpse into his positive freedom. This is be-
cause confidence in God’s existence would bring about the judgement that 
remaining honest and facing the gallows is recommended by prudence 
(because of divine punishments and rewards).
This point generalizes to all of us. Anyone who is convinced of God’s 
existence from the outset will be unable to view moral conduct as in-
volving a risk of their own happiness. Such individuals may still succumb 
to temptation and violate the law, but they could not view obedience to 
the law as an act of self-sacrifice. Hence, they will not be able to recognize 
their true freedom and develop respect for the moral law as the incentive 
to their right conduct. Thus, given the possibility that a world devoid of 
natural evil would be one in which many people would take God’s exis-
tence to be obvious from the beginning, the Kantian justification for divine 
hiddenness provides a plausible motivation for God’s allowing natural 
evil.
As with all traditional theodicies, there are many points at which one 
might wish to challenge the Kantian theodicy that I have outlined. Al-
though I do not have space here to consider all of the relevant objections, I 
shall now address a few that strike me as most pressing.48
An initial worry concerns the apparent implication that those who re-
ceive a religious upbringing and maintain strong faith in God throughout 
48The strategy of utilizing a reply to hiddenness for the purpose of theodicy is employed 
by Swinburne, Is There a God? Although Dumsday is skeptical of the standard free-will reply 
championed by Swinburne, he is sympathetic to the general approach of extending replies 
to hiddenness for the purpose of overcoming the problem of evil. For helpful discussion of 
objections to this strategy, see Dumsday, “How Divine Hiddenness Sheds Light,” 319–322. 
75OF PROVIDENCE AND PUPPET SHOWS
their formative years are thereby unable to develop virtue. While there is 
indeed such an implication, it is not as problematic as it seems. A person 
raised to believe in God would only lose out on the possibility of virtue if 
she consistently maintains a faith so strong that she never comes to expe-
rience an apparent conflict between prudence and morality. And it is hard 
to imagine anyone making it through their lives in the world as we find it 
(i.e., full of seemingly undeserved and purposeless suffering) without ever 
experiencing doubts about God’s existence.
One might next object to the Kantian theodicy by suggesting that, even 
if the presence of some natural evil in the world is necessary for the pos-
sibility of human virtue, there needn’t be such an excessive amount. But 
assuming that at least some natural evil must occur, it may not be possible 
to diminish the quantity without creating other problems. For instance, it 
may be the case that a world containing any amount of natural evil greater 
than zero but less than what we find in the actual world would be one 
in which many events occur that defy scientific explanation. Consider a 
world in which non-human animals do not experience pain, or a world in 
which earthquakes occur only in unpopulated areas. Given our scientific 
knowledge of biology and geology, such states of affairs would be deeply 
puzzling. It would be difficult to explain why creatures that share so 
many physical traits with humans would not also be susceptible to pain. 
Likewise, the lack of earthquakes in populated cities would contradict 
our general knowledge of plate tectonics. Hence, the best explanation for 
these phenomena might have to involve appeals to divine intervention.49 
While it is difficult to say with certainty that anything less than the amount 
of natural ill in the actual world would threaten God’s hiddenness, this 
hypothesis is rendered tenable by the fact that certain reductions of evil 
would clearly have this result.
A third objection claims that appealing to the importance of God’s hid-
denness as a reply to the problem of evil is self-defeating. If we need to 
have doubts about God’s existence in order to develop virtue, wouldn’t 
it be best if we could not find a reasonable explanation for natural evil? 
After all, natural evil is a source of doubt precisely because it strikes us 
as inconsistent with the will of a morally perfect creator. If it turns out 
that the existence of natural evil is exactly what we should expect in a 
world created by God, then such evil couldn’t serve the purpose of gener-
ating doubts. The best response to this worry is related to my criticism of 
Kant’s construal of the aims of theodicy. Recall that Kant views traditional 
theodicies as attempts to definitively vindicate divine providence in the 
face of evil in the world. As I argued above, theodicies should not be un-
derstood as having such an ambitious aim. The Kantian theodicy I have 
proposed does not purport to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that 
all suffering is for the best and that the universe is under the beneficent 
governance of God. Rather, the theodicy posits an explanation for how 
49Dumsday, “How Divine Hiddenness Sheds Light,” 321–322. 
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natural evil might be for the best, without conclusively demonstrating that 
it is.
Indeed, we have already encountered two significant instances of un-
certainty within the Kantian theodicy. First, we cannot be certain whether 
natural evil is necessary for God’s remaining sufficiently hidden—perhaps 
everyone would still have sufficient moments of doubt even in a world 
without natural ills. Second, even if natural evil is necessary for hidden-
ness, we cannot be certain that such an abundance as we find on earth is 
necessary. Since we cannot be certain about either of these issues, it is not 
unreasonable to continue to harbor some doubts about God’s existence 
in light of the problem of natural evil. But the considerations raised in 
discussion of these issues indicate that the problem of natural evil may be 
less threatening to the reasonableness of theism than many have taken it 
to be. The reasonableness of theism would be significantly undermined if 
we could not find any plausible justification for natural evil. The Kantian 
theodicy provides a justification that has prima facie plausibility without 
claiming certainty. Hence, the Kantian theodicy appears to contribute to 
the case for theism without being self-defeating.
6. Conclusion
In the preface to the 2nd edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant fa-
mously remarks that he found it necessary to “deny knowledge in order 
to make room for faith.”50 It should now be clear how Kant’s prioritizing 
of faith over knowledge is manifested in his explanation of God’s hidden-
ness. Faith is prioritized not because knowledge of God would force us to 
act rightly, but rather because it would prevent us from experiencing the 
moral law as something that is self-imposed and independent from all 
considerations of prudence. Only such experience can provide insight into 
our freedom and generate respect as the incentive to right conduct. Hence, 
God’s hiddenness is necessary for the ushering in of the highest good and 
is consequently something to be celebrated rather than lamented.
Not only is Kant’s argument deeper and more compelling than the 
standard free-will reply to hiddenness, it also provides the foundation 
for an underexplored response to the problem of natural evil. Although 
Kant claims that attempts to justify the presence of evil on God’s behalf 
involve either illicit assertions about the unknowable or untenable denials 
of moral responsibility, this is not true of all theodicies. The aim of theo-
dicy should be only to posit an explanation for God’s allowing evil that is 
plausible enough to fully preserve the reasonableness of theism. Unlike 
bare appeals to God’s “mysterious ways” or the importance of having our 
faith tested, the Kantian considerations pertaining to hiddenness yield a 
theodicy that provides a substantive justification for the existence of nat-
ural evil. Doubts about God’s existence play an ineliminable role in moral 
development because they allow us to gain insight into our freedom and 
50Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B xxx. 
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subsequently develop respect the moral law. Since the presence of natural 
suffering in the world is by far the greatest source of theistic doubt, natural 
evil may be a necessary background condition for the crucial experience of 
moral-prudential conflict.
The extent to which this Kantian theodicy can stave off the skeptical 
challenge from natural evil is a matter for further inquiry. But we can 
be certain that, despite Kant’s claims to the contrary, such investigations 
needn’t lead us down a path towards servility and insincerity.51
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